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STUDENT-ON-STUDENT HARASSMENT:
A NEW PARADIGM FOR CANADIAN
HUMAN RIGHTS LEGISLATION
WILLIAM

GEORGAst

ABSTRACT

Canadian school boards have recently begun to find themselves
inthe position of respondent under human rights complaints filed for
cases of student-on-student harassment. This has raised serious questions regarding the extent of school board liability for the acts of
students. It is possible for the cmTent hmnan rights legislation in Nova
Scotia, used as a model in this discussion, to have jurisdiction over peer
harassment; however, the procedural and substantive obstacles that need
to be overcome make it a far from satisfactory avenue for a victim to
pursue.
The recent United States Supreme Court case of Davis v. Monroe
County Board of Education has established that it is possible to ground
such a complaint under the relevant American federal human rights
legislation. If the reasoning in that case lends any guidance as to how a
similar issue may be resolved in Canada, it is that there is not much that
separates a human rights complaint from a civil action in negligence or
breach of fiduciary duty. The effectiveness of human rights regimes in
protecting victims of student-on-student harassment needs to be assessed in light of the increasing frequency of such incidents.

t William Georgas obtained a B.A. (Hons) in 1995 from the University of Toronto in
Urban & Economic Geography; Enviromnent and Resource Management. In 1998 he obtained a Certificate in Criminology (with distinction) from the same institution. He graduated
with an LLB from Dalhousie University in 200 I and is currently an articling student at Fasken
Martineau DuMoulin in Toronto, Ontario.

STUDENT-ON-STUDENT ... 37

I. INTRODUCTION
The experiences of students in primary or secondary schools can vary
enormously. Student interactions can range from some of the most enjoyable and enlightening aspects of one's youth, to devastating relations of
persistent torment and abuse. Each school with a school body in the
thousands can expect to have its share of bullies and victims. As a result,
many students are singled out for a brand of treatment that exceeds
acceptable schoolyard behaviour. Students subjected to teasing, malicious
pranks, and physical and verbal abuse ought to be able to rely on school
authorities to curb the intolerably cruel behaviour of other students.
The concept of "peer harassment" has been used to define behaviour
in schools that crosses the boundary between appropriate and inappropriate teasing and conflict that may occur between students in a school.
Those harassed may be targeted because of characteristics such as race,
sex or sexual orientation that are protected by human rights legislation.
However, peer harassment may also occur because a student is simply
an outcast, or does not fit comfortably into the school community. In this
paper, the tem1s "peer harassment" and "student-on-student harassment" will be used interchangeably, and will refer to harassment that so
exceeds the nonn that it creates an adverse learning environment.
An unprecedented human rights complaint has recently been filed in
British Columbia that seeks to entrench the concept of peer harassment
as an action under that province's human rights legislation. The complainant, Azmi Jubran, has lodged a complaint with the British Columbia Human Rights Commission against the North Vancouver School
Board in an effort to hold it accountable for the harassment that he
allegedly experienced while a high school student in the public school
system.
Mr. Jubran alleges that he experienced persistent harassment at the
hands of other students. Although Mr. Jubran has stated that he is not
homosexual, he was branded as such by his peers. Consequently, he was
persecuted through teasing, threats, and physical violence that escalated
to the extent that at one point he was intentionally set on fire by a
classmate in a classroom. 1 Thus, Mr. Jubran claims he was discrimi1 The hearing before the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal commenced in September, 2000 with the opening allegations and testimony of the complainant. The respondent
school board is scheduled to respond in Janua1y, 2001.
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nated against on the prohibited ground of sexual orientation. Human
rights commentators are watching this decision closely, since it will
decide whether human rights legislation can be invoked to hold a school
board liable for the discriminatory acts of its students.
This paper will examine student-on-student harassment in the context of Canadian legal principles, and determine whether such a complaint can, and should, be properly characterized as a recognizable
human rights violation by the school board. I will also examine the
liability of school boards in light of civil liability in tort law and
common law fiduciary duties. The Nova Scotia Human Rights Act2 will
be used as the model human rights legislation for detennining whether a
school may be found liable for the acts of harassment by its students. 3
Harassment based on sex and sexual orientation will be the focus of
this paper, as these issues have received the most judicial and academic
examination thus far. This, however, does not diminish the impo1iance
of other grounds of discrimination that arise in the school context; these
grounds are implicitly included in the following elaboration on general
principles of human rights protection. Recently, the United States Supreme Court decided that peer sexual harassment can constitute a valid
action under commensurate anti-discrimination legislation in that country.4 A strong dissent, however, has emphasized that bringing such
complaints into the realm of statutory human rights protection is not a
simple or straightforward exercise. I will therefore compare the two
systems to assess and contrast principles underlying human rights legislation that are relevant to student-on-student harassment.
It will become apparent that allowing human rights legislation to
have jurisdiction over peer harassment is indeed possible, but it is far
from a perfect means of addressing such behaviour. Holding a school
board responsible for the "discriminatory" actions of its sh1dents requires
overcoming procedural hurdles within the Act and corollary case law, as
well as applying a policy-driven approach to such a complaint. Ultimately, the Act, or any equivalent Canadian human rights legislation,
2

R.S.N.S., c. 214, s. 1, as am 1991 c. 12 [hereinafter the "Act"].
Under s. 93, Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Viet., c. 3, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985,
Appendix II, No. 5, education falls under the provincial head of power. As such, provincial
hmnan rights legislation is appropriately applied to allegations of discrimination as they
pertain to the provision of educational services.
4
Davis v. Monroe County Board ofEducation, 119 S. Ct. 1661 (1999) [hereinafter Davis].
3
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may only be able to remedy the type of egregious behaviour that would
otherwise already be validly addressed by established principles of
negligence or breach of fiduciary duty. This further poses the question
whether student-on-student harassment should enter the arena of human
rights legislation or stay within the boundaries of traditional civil liability.

II. THE APPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS LEGISLATION
TO PEER HARASSMENT IN SCHOOLS

1. Peer Harassment as Discrimination
Student-on-student harassment may manifest itself in three distinct
ways relevant to prohibited grounds of discrimination under human
rights legislation. First, there is discrimination that results from sexual
harassment, which is specifically defined in the Act. 5 Second, discrimination may arise from harassment based on any of the other prohibited
grounds enumerated in the Act. 6 Third, there is harassment that cannot
be pigeon-holed in a enumerated ground (thus does not lead to discrimination that can be remedied by the Act), yet which is nonetheless as
damaging to the victim's ability to properly benefit from his or her
learning environment. The implications of this paradox will be addressed later in this paper. It is necessary, however, to first address the
operation of the Act as it relates to student harassment on enumerated
grounds, as the potential for non-unifonn application of the Act may
exist depending on the basis of the harassing behaviour.
Section 5 of the Act prohibits discrimination based on specific
enumerated grounds:
5.

(1) No person shall in respect of

(a) the provision of or access to services or facilities;
discriminate against an individual or class of individuals on account
of
(h) age;
5

6

s. 5(2).
s. 5(1).
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(i) race;
(j) colour;
(k) religion;

(I) creed;
(m) sex;
(n) sexual orientation;
(o) physical disability or mental disability;
(p) an irrational fear of contracting an illness or disease;
(q) ethnic, national or aboriginal origin;
(r) family status;
(s) marital status;
(t) source of income;
(u) political belief, affiliation or activity;
(v) that individual's association with another individual or class
of individuals having characteristics referred to in clauses (h) to (u). 7

Canadian jurisprudence has established that education is a service or
facility within the meaning of human rights legislation. 8 Thus, it will
constitute a prima facie case of discrimination when a student's access
to educational services or facilities is hindered or denied on a prohibited
ground.
Less straightforward, however, is the extent to which harassment on
an enumerated ground can constitute discrimination. As mentioned
previously, "sexual harassment" enjoys extensive statutory protection in
human rights legislation due to its ubiquity in society. The Supreme
Court of Canada ruled decisively in Janzen v. Platy Enterprises Ltd. 9
that sexual harassment should be properly characterized as discrimination based on sex, making it considerably easier for a complainant to
establish a prima facie case of discrimination than it is for harassment
based on other enumerated grounds, for which such pronouncements
have not been made. Consequently, human rights codes have codified

Ibid.
Peel Board of Education v. Ontario (Human Rights Commission) (1990), 72 O.R. (2d)
593 (Div. Ct.).
9
[1989] 1 S.C.R. 1252 [hereinafter Jan::en].
7

8
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prohibitions of sexual harassment, such as section 1(2) of the Act, which
states that "[n]o person shall sexually harass an individual."IO
Furthermore, "sexual harassment" has been specifically defined in
the Act; however, this definition is broad enough to capture the full
range of persecution that a complainant could typically experience.
While the decision in Janzen left no doubt that sexual harassment
constitutes disciiminatory behaviour, the Act reinforces this in section
3(o):
s. 3(o) "sexual harassment" means
(i)
vexatious sexual conduct or a course of comment that is
known or ought reasonably to be known as unwelcome,
(ii) a sexual solicitation or advance made to an individual by
another individual where the other individual is in a position to
confer a benefit on, or deny a benefit to, the individual to whom
the solicitation or advance is made, where the individual who
makes the solicitation or advance knows or ought reasonably to
know that it is unwelcome, or
(iii) a reprisal or threat of reprisal against an individual for
rejecting a sexual solicitation or advance. ll

Considerable protection is offered to complainants under s. 3(o)(i),
which proscribes a wide range of inappropriate behaviour. Thus,
s.3(o )(i) could protect students from peer harassment, particularly in
light of the broad and purposive interpretation typically accorded to
human lights legislation. Although sections 3(o)(ii) and (iii) appear to
primaiily protect employees from sexual harassment in the workplace,
such as quid pro quo sexual harassment, they may still apply to studenton-student harassment. Sexual harassment in schools manifests itself in
a myiiad of coercive ways, not the least of which is an offensive verbal
invective dispensed by other students. 12 The "hostile" or "poisoned"
enviromnent created by the harassment hinders the victim's ability to
fully benefit from available services or opportunities. As a result of the
broad statutory definition of "sexual harassment," a complainant will
have less difficulty establishing a prima facie case of disciimination,
which is defined in section 4 of the Act:
Supra note 2, section 5(2).
Supra note 2, section 3(o).
I 2 C. Richard, "Surviving Student to Student Harassment: Legal Remedies and Prevention
Programmes" (1996) Dal. L.J. 169.
10

II
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4. For the purpose of this Act, a person discriminates where the person
makes a distinction, whether intentional or not, based on a characteristic,
or perceived characteristic, referred to in clauses (h) to (v) of subsection
(I) of Section 5 that has the effect of imposing burdens, obligations or
disadvantages on an individual or a class of individuals not imposed upon
others or which withholds or limits access to opp01iunities, benefits and
advantages available to other individuals or classes of individuals in
society. 13

A clear definition of sexual harassment may not necessarily provide
a quick and easy avenue for resolving a human rights complaint on those
grounds. As the following discussion will demonstrate, it is not a simple
task to find a school board liable for student-on-student harassment
under the Act. It may be possible that it is the teacher- through his or her
inaction or lack of appropriate response to the sexual harassment - who
is guilty of discrimination under the Act, and not the harassing student.
In such a case, the relevant discrimination would not be "sexual harassment" as defined in section 3(o ), but rather discrimination based on sex
through the unacceptable dismissiveness with which the victim's fears
and complaints were handled. Thus, establishing a human rights violation against a school board for peer sexual harassment, may necessitate
an approach that is predicated on harassment based on sex, and not
notions of defined "sexual harassment."
The second type of harassment is based on grounds prohibited by the
Act, other than sexual harassment. As there is no similar specific definition for harassment other than sexual harassment it will be necessary for
a complainant to demonstrate that the harassment constitutes discrimination.
It could be argued that the statutory definition of "sexual harassment" implies that other types of harassment do not constitute prima
facie discrimination. Further, it could be argued that the historic and
almost universal subjugation of women justifies distinguishing between
"sex" and the other enumerated factors in a discrimination analysis.
However, the purposive approach taken in the interpretation of human
rights legislation suggests that establishing hierarchies within the Act's
scope of protection is inherently antithetical to its underlying principles
of equality.

13

Supra note 2, section 4.
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Ultimately, the preferable approach is to recognize that harassment
based on any of the prohibited grounds will not be tolerated, and the
jurisprudence interpreting "sexual harassment" applies equally to the
interpretation of "harassment" generally. Indeed, the Canadian Human
Rights Act14 affams that all prohibited grounds of discrimination should
be treated equally by recognizing harassment based on the other
grounds. In particular, section 14 states:
14. ( 1) It is a discriminatory practice,
(a) in the provision of goods, services, facilities or accommodation
customarily available to the general public,
(b) in the provision of commercial premises or residential
acco1mnodation, or
(c) in matters related to employment,
to harass an individual on a prohibited ground of discrimination. 15

Harassment based on racial and sexual orientation should be treated
as discriminat01y activity equally with sexual harassment 16 due to its
increasing prevalence and impact. A learning environment is no less
hostile because a student is being harassed on one prohibited ground
instead of another. As such, all "unwanted vexatious comments and
conduct" premised on a prohibited ground ought to constitute harassment and a subsequent prima facie case of discrimination. The principle
that no one prohibited ground should be granted supremacy over another
will be reflected in the following sections, even though neither the Act
nor the jurisprudence unequivocally supports this interpretation.
2. The Accountability of School Boards for the Acts of their
Students in Peer Harassment
Establishing a successful human rights complaint against a school
board for the harassing actions of one student against another under the
Act requires overcoming several technical obstacles. School boards, as
corporations, can only act through their employees, officers and agents.
Consequently, it is of no surprise that the discriminatory actions of an
employee (such as a superintendent, principal or teacher) towards a
14

R.S.C., 1985, c. H-6, s. 3.
See Canadian Human Rights Act, ibid., s. 14.
16
B.J. Bowlby & J.W. Regan, An Educator's Guide to Human Rights. (Aurora: Aurora
Professional Press, 1998) at 45.
15
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student will be "deemed" to be the actions of the school board. This is
specifically laid out in section 40 of the Act, which reads:
40. A prosecution for an offence under this Act may be brought against
an employers' organization, employees' organization, professional
association or business or trade association in the name of the
organization or association, and for the purpose of any prosecution these
are deemed to be corporations and any act or thing done or omitted by an
officer or agent within the scope of the officer or agent's authority to act
on behalf of the organization or association is deemed to be an act or thing
done or omitted by the organization or association. 17

However, there is no equivalent legal provision that would deem the
school board to be responsible for the acts of one student towards
another. This makes it difficult to find the school board responsible for
the conduct of its students under the Act. However, close scrutiny of the
Act reveals three possible avenues by which this may be accomplished.
The first, as mentioned previously, is to find a direct act of discrimination by an agent of the school board, such as a principal or teacher, and
thereby hold the school board responsible under section 40 of the Act.
The second is to hold the school board vicariously liable for the acts of
the harassing students; this would impute a type of strict liability onto
the school board. The third option is to find a possible middle ground
between the first two approaches. A modified direct liability model
would allow the school board a defence of due diligence in the event that
it exercised every reasonable effort to avoid the discriminatory conduct
of its agents.
Since a complaint of student-on-student harassment has never been
heard by a Canadian human rights tribunal until the pending Jubran
case, there is no guidance in the case law as to the possible success of
such an action.
The conflict between various legal principles becomes apparent in
the effort to hold school boards accountable. For instance, on the one
hand, it is well established that school boards ought to, and in fact do,
have a duty to provide a learning environment that is free from discrimination. Conversely, school authorities ca1111ot monitor every student's
behaviour, and it is inherently unfair to hold someone accountable for
something over which he or she has no control. Furthermore, the envi17

Supra note 2, s. 40.
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ronment of the individuals involved should not be forgotten. Primary
and secondary school students have, by viitue of their age, a diminished
capacity to appreciate the consequences of their actions, and ascribing
adult standards of "discrimination" to their conduct may not always be
appropriate.
a. Direct Liability Theory
School boards are obliged to provide their students with a learning
environment free from discrimination. A board that fails to discharge
this duty will be liable for a statutory action for discrimination. The
specific obligations of the school board include preventing, and ending,
any harassment or discrimination to which any of its students are subjected, and of which it is made aware tlu·ough its employees. 18 These
duties derive from human rights legislation, as well as the statutory
duties outlined in the Act. Bowlby posits that "once the conduct comes
to the attention of a teacher, a responsibility to take action to stop the
harassment will arise." 19
.In such cases, any teachers that are aware of such damaging harassment, and who do not sufficiently address the issue, would be directly
discriminating against the student by limiting the student's access to
educational opportunities. The discrimination would lie in the indifference and disrespect with which such complaints are treated, as this is
reflective of an attitude that stereotypes and diminishes the significance
of the victim's situation.
The "person" responsible for the discrimination as stipulated in
section 5 of the Act would be the teacher. 2° Finding the teacher to be the
person refen-ed to in section 5 requires a broad and purposive, though
not unreasonable, interpretation of the te1m "person". The term "person"
as defined in the Act is not exhaustive, and certainly may include
teachers:
3. (k) "person" includes employer, employers' organization,
employees' organization, professional association, business or trade
association, whether acting directly or indirectly, alone or with another,
or by the interposition of another. 21 [Emphasis added]
is Supra
l9 Supra
20
Supra
21
Supra

note
note
note
note

14 at 63.
14 at 64.
2.
2, s. 3 (k).
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Thus if a teacher is a person who has discriminated through inaction, the
school board would be held liable under the deeming provision in
section 40 of the Act. 22
Such an approach was taken in the Unites States Supreme Court case
of Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education. 23 In that case, the
school district was found liable under American anti-discrimination
legislation for the inaction of the teachers and principal in response to
repeated complaints about the sexually harassing behaviour of a specific
student. The majority, finding the school district directly liable, held that
it is not so much the acts of the offending student that are impugned as it
is the failure of the school to adequately protect its students when alerted
to a problem of harassment. This finding supports the principle that
liability will be found where one fails to fulfill a duty to perfonn in a
ce1iain manner.
In its controversial 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court in Davis rnled
that school districts can be held liable for the sexual harassment of one
student by another, and that the approach to be taken is the same as when
the harassment is done by a teacher or another district employee. The
applicable American law is a piece of federal legislation under Title IX
of the Education Amendments of 1972.24 This legislation creates a
statutory private right of action that may be brought by an individual
against a school board. Title IX provides that:
[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded
from patticipation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any education program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance. 25

This legislation was enacted to fill the gap between Title VF6 and
Title VIP of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Its purpose was to address
22

Supra note 2.
Davis, supra note 4.
24
86 Stat. 373, as amended, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq.
25
20 U.S.C. § 168l(a).
26
"No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 42 U.S.C § 2000d
(1994).
27
"It shall be an tmlawful employment practice for an employer. .. to discriminate against
any individual with respect to ... compensation, tenns, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's ... sex." 42 U.S.C § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1994).
23
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the historic exclusion of women from fields of education and employment, as well as discriminatory treatment within those fields. 28 It is
important to note that even the combination of these pieces of human
rights legislation does not address all of the prohibited grounds in the
Act, such as sexual orientation. Although the following discussion of
Davis necessarily addresses only discrimination based on sex, later
discussion will relate its reasoning to the broader protections afforded
by the Act.
In Davis, the petitioner was the mother ofLaShonda Davis, a female
grade five student who attended Hubbard Elementary School, a public
school in Monroe County, Georgia. The school received federal funding
and was thus subject to the requirements of Title IX. The petitioner
alleged that the actions of one of her daughter's classmates amounted to
prolonged sexual harassment, which her school failed to remedy despite
repeated pleas for assistance. The accepted facts indicated that the
victim's classmate, G.F., made repeated attempts to touch her breasts
and genital area, made vulgar statements, and engaged in general
behaviour that amounted to sexual harassment. This behaviour, which
persisted over several months, culminated with G.F. pleading to a
criminal charge of sexual battery as a result of his misconduct. The
victim experienced considerable anxiety, an inability to concentrate at
school, and a drop in her grades. Her father had found a suicide note that
she had written. 29
The issue before the court was an application for certiorari, based on
the decision of the United States Court of Appeal for the Eleventh
Circuit which held that student-on-student harassment was not a valid
statement of claim under Title IX. 30 The majority of the United States
Supreme Court reversed that decision and stated:
We consider here whether a private damages action may lie against the
school board in cases of student-on-student harassment. We conclude
that it may, but only where the federal funding recipient acts with
deliberate indifference to known acts of harassment in its programs or
activities. Moreover, we conclude that such an action will lie only for

28
M. Rich-Chappell, "Child's Play or Sex Discrimination?: School Liability for Peer
Sexual Harassment Under Title IX" (1999) 3 J. Gender, Race & Justice 311 at 314.
29
Davis, supra note 4 at 1667.
30 Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education et al., 120 F.3d 1390 (I I th Cir. 1997).
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harassment that is so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that
it effectively bars the victim's access to an educational opportunity or
benefit. 31

This analysis boldly founds the source of the discrimination solely
on the school district in the form of the "deliberate indifference" with
which it responds to known acts of harassment. While this might be seen
to diminish the overall culpability of the offending student, it reinforces
the direct nature of the discriminatory actions, or inaction, of school
authorities.
i. Control

One of the key principles to arise from this case is that control over
the behaviour of the student is a requirement. The court established a
low threshold for invoking such liability; it stated clearly that, in order
for a school to have sufficient control over the student to impose
liability, the acts must take place on school grounds and the school must
have a means of affecting student behaviour through discipline. The
court stated:
Moreover, because the harassment must occur "under" "the operations
of' a recipient, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681(a), 1687, the harassment must take
place in a context subject to the school district's control. These factors
combine to limit a recipient's damages liability to circumstances
wherein the recipient exercises substantial control over both the harasser and the context in which the known harassment occurs. Where,
as here, the misconduct occurs during school hours and on school
grounds, misconduct is taking place "under" an "operation" of the
recipient. In these circumstances, the recipient retains substantial control over the context in which the harassment occurs. More importantly, in this setting, the Board exercises significant control over the
harasser, for it has disciplinmy authority over its students. 32 [Emphasis added]

Such a notion of control is not clearly specified in the Act, nor in any
other provincial human rights legislation. However, it seems intuitively
obvious that one needs to have control over the acts of another in order
to be found to have discriminated through failure to correct those acts or
effect change through such control. To suggest that someone ought to do
31
32

Davis, supra note 4 at 1666 (per O'Co1mor J.).
Davis, supra note 4 at 1665.
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something (a positive act of some sort), implies that that person can in
fact do that act. In this context, a court should be able to find that a
school board has discriminated (i.e. that it ought to have prevented the
harassment, but did not) only ifthe school board had the authority to do
so (i.e. that it could control the behaviour of the offender).
The authority to control the behaviour of the offender exists in
Canadian law as a combination of duty and express statutory authority.
The Nova Scotia Education Act33 imposes duties on the school board to
establish policies dealing with student discipline - along with duties on
the teacher to uphold such disciplinary policies associated with student
conduct - and on the students to abide by such policies. The relevant
sections of the Education Act read as follows:
64. (2) A school board shall, in accordance with this Act and the
regulations,
(r) establish a regional student-discipline policy consistent with the
Provincial discipline policy established by the Minister; ...
(t) establish a policy for the protection of students and employees
from harassment and abuse; 34
26. ( 1) It is the duty of a teacher in a public school to
(l) maintain appropriate order and discipline in the school or room
in the teacher's charge and repo1t to the principal or other person in
charge of the school the conduct of any student who is persistently
defiant or disobedient; 35

24. (1) It is the duty of a student to
(c) contribute to an orderly and safe learning environment;
(d) respect the rights of others; and
(e) comply with the discipline policies of the school and the school
board. 36

S.N.S. 1995-96, c. I, s. 1, as am. 1998, c. 18, s. 555 [hereinafter Education Act].
See "Education Act, ibid. section 64(2).
35
Supra note 33, s. 26(1 ).
36
Supra note 33, s. 24(1) [emphasis added].
33

34
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The ability of school authorities to administer disciplinary authority
is also vested in the Education Act. A student who is "persistently
disobedient" or who conducts himself or herself in "a manner likely to
affect injuriously the welfare or education of other students" may be
removed from the class by the teacher37 or suspended by the principal. 38
The suspension may last for no more than five days and it requires that
the principal give notice and reasons for the suspension in writing to the
student, the student's teachers, the school board, and the student's
parents. 39 Furthennore, courts have found that "[t]here is a presumption
of validity in favour of the action taken by the school and, unless the
validity of the exercise of the power appears on the face of the act, the
correctness of the action taken thereunder may be presumed unless and
until the contrary is shown."40
School boards in Nova Scotia have the duty and the authority to
control the behaviour of their students through discipline. Thus, requiring that school authorities exert appropriate control over their students
to prevent harassment is not an unreasonable demand in a claim of
discrimination.
The dissent in Davis, clearly of the opinion that school districts
would be unduly hampered by such onerous obligations, noted the
limited control in practice that schools have over their students:
Most public schools do not screen or select students, and their power
to discipline students is far from unfettered. Public schools are generally obligated by law to educate all students who live within defined
geographic boundaries. Indeed, the Constitution of almost every State
in the country guarantees the State's students a free primmy and
secondary public education. 41

The dissent further raised the concern that disciplinary authority
must not violate the constitutional or legal rights of students. They
recalled the previous United States Supreme Comt decision of Goss v.
Lopez, 42 which held due process requires at the ve1y minim1m1, a student
37

Supra note 33, s. 121.
Supra note 33, s. 122.
39
Supra note 33, s. 123( 1).
40
Lutes v. Board ofEducation of Prairie View School Division No. 74 (1992), 101 Sask. R.
232 (Q.B.) at 237 per Barclay J. [hereinafter Lutes].
41
Davis, supra note 4 at 1681.
42
95 S. Ct. 729 ( 1975).
38
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facing suspension must be given some kind of notice and hearing. 43
Furthennore, it was noted that there was a potential conflict between the
alleged Title IX requirements to discipline students engaged in discriminatoiy behaviour and provisions under other anti-discrimination legislation that protect students with behaviour disorder disabilities from inappropriate disciplinary action. 44
While the dissent may appear to suggest that school authorities lack
the power to control their students through discipline, the main thrust of
its opposition more accurately acknowledges the practical difficulties in
exerting valid authority to control students. As Kennedy J. states:
The practical obstacles schools encounter in ensuring that thousands
of immature students confonn to acceptable nom1s may be even more
significant than the legal obstacles. School districts cannot exercise the
same measure of control over thousands of students that they do over a
few hundred employees. The limited resources of our schools must be
conserved for basic educational services. Some schools lack the resources even to deal with serious problems of violence and are already
overwhelmed with disciplinary problems of all kinds. 45

This perspective is troubling because it fails to recognize that "basic
educational services" are meaningless if a student cannot have full
access to and use of them as a result of the egregious conduct of other
students. As the Jubran case has revealed, violence is inextricably
linked to harassment since the condemnation and cessation of the initial
verbal harassment may reduce the later problems of physical violence
referred to by Kennedy J.
In discharging the duty to protect students from discrimination due
to."deliberate indifference" to peer harassment, the majority in Davis set
a remarkably low standard, premised on the school's intent to act on a
complaint instead of the actual result of the school's action. The court
noted:
We stress that our conclusion here - that recipients may be liable for
their deliberate indifference to known acts of peer sexual harassment does not mean that recipients can avoid liability only by purging their
schools of actionable peer harassment or that administrators must
engage in paiiicular disciplinary action. We thus disagree with the
43
44
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respondent's contention that, if Title IX provides a cause of action for
student-on-student harassment, "nothing shott of expulsion of every
student accused of misconduct involving sexual overtones would protect school systems from liability or damages ...
School administrators will continue to enjoy the flexibility they require so long as funding recipients are deemed "deliberately indifferent" to acts of student-on-student harassment only where the
recipient's response to harassment or lack thereof is clearly unreasonable in light of the known circumstances ... [T]he recipient must merely
respond to known peer harassment in a manner that is not clearly
zmreasonable. This is not a mere "reasonableness" standard, as the
dissent assumes ... In an appropriate case, there is no reason why
comts, on a motion to dismiss, for sununary judgment, or for a
directed verdict, could not identify a response as not "clearly unreasonable" as a matter of law. 46 [Emphasis added]

Thus, the majority has apparently decided that it is possible for peer
sexual harassment that deprives an individual of her right to an education to continue so long as the school has not acted in a "clearly
unreasonable" manner in attempting to curb it; focusing more on intentions than results-based approach. While this may be an acceptable
approach in American jurispmdence, it certainly is not so in Canada. It is
submitted that the majority in Davis, in attempting to strike a balance
between demanding that schools fulfill their obligations to their students
on the one hand, and respecting the rights of offending students to be
free from disproportionate discipline on the other, excessively favours
the latter. This low threshold is at odds with the true purposes of Title IX.
The Supreme Court of Canada in Robichaud v. Canada (Treasury
Board) stated that the purpose of human rights legislation "is remedial.
Its aim is to identify and eliminate discrimination.''47 Under the Act, or
any other human rights legislation, a Canadian school should discharge
its duty if it successfully eliminates harassing behaviour, and not merely
if it acts in a manner that is not "clearly unreasonable" in an attempt to
do so.
The majority in Davis, similar to the dissent, also noted the limitations a school may face in attempting to curb the behaviour of its
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students. They noted that "it would be entirely reasonable for a school to
refrain from a fonn of disciplinary action that would expose it to
constitutional or statutory claims."48 Such claims, at least in the Nova
Scotia context, include a student's rights to freedom of expression49 and
assembly, 50 as well as statutory rights to an education. While a Charter
analysis is beyond the scope of this paper, it should be noted that
harassment has never been justified as a legitimate form of expression,
nor should it be. Basic liberties will always be infringed when a student
is disciplined in school for the inappropriate comments he or she makes,
or for being associated with the activities of certain crowds or gangs.
However, deference should be, and typically is, granted to school authorities in meting out discipline, and, for better or worse, Charter
claims by students challenging discipline meet with little success. 51 In
the case of harassment, this is likely for the better.
ii. Denial of Educational Opportunities

Title IX and the Nova Scotia Act are similar since both prohibit the
denial or limitation of access to the benefits of educational services. The
special status of "sexual harassment" in Canadian jurisprudence facilitates a prima facie finding of discrimination. As discussed earlier,
harassment based on other grounds ought to be treated equally. However, because student-on-student harassment is a new claim under Canadian human rights legislation, a complainant may indeed have to prove a
denial of services despite findings of prima facie discrimination when
harassment has occurred. Such was the case in Davis, where the court
noted that while sexual harassment is an established form of discrimination for Title IX purposes, it was "constrained to conclude that studenton-student sexual harassment, if sufficiently severe, can likewise rise to
the level of discrimination actionable under the statute."52
The majority establishes an unusually high standard in order to
demonstrate that a student has been deprived of the benefits of an
educational program as a result of peer harassment. They note:
Davis, supra note 4 at 1674.
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s. 2(b), Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982,
being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c.11 [hereinafter Charter].
50
lb id. s. 2( d).
51
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52
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The most obvious example of student-on-student sexual harassment
capable of triggering a damages claim would thus involve the ove1t,
physical deprivation of access to school resources. Consider, for example, a case in which male students physically threaten female
students every day, successfully preventing the female students from
using a particular resource - an athletic field or a computer lab, for
instance ... It is not necessary, however, to show physical exclusion to
demonstrate that students have been deprived by the actions of another
student or students of an educational opportunity on the basis of sex.
Rather, a plaintiff must establish sexual harassment of students that is
so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive, and that so undermines and detracts from the victim's educational experience, that the
victim-students are effectively denied equal access to an institution's
resources and opportunities. 53

The court noted that while a decline in grades is indicative of a
potential link between the harassment and the denial of educational
benefits, it is the totality of the circumstances that should be examined,
including the persistence of the harassment and the extent of the inaction
of school authorities. 54 It is difficult to set a definitive threshold above
which harassment transfonns from an interference with one's dignity
that can be addressed by infonnal school discipline, into an intolerable
violation of human rights that results in discrimination and invites the
sanctions of anti-discrimination legislation. The majority's case-by-case
analysis recognizes the inherent difficulty of such a determination. This
is the most appropriate way to approach a statute that focuses on the
effects of discrimination, and it is the approach that should be adopted
by Canadian courts when these issues arise.
In sum, the majority decision in Davis has adopted a test for direct
discrimination on the part of school authorities that depends largely on
the school's ability to exert control over the conduct of its students.
Despite the flaws in the "not clearly unreasonable" threshold test of the
exercise of disciplinary authority, this approach is true to principles that
prefer to lay blame directly rather than blame via indirect mechanisms of
vicarious liability. Here, the decision is not that the student has discriminated, rather it is that the school has discriminated because its authorities
are deliberately indifferent to the plight of a victimized member of its
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student body. The effect of such treatment must be an outright deprivation of equal access to educational opportunities, which is a high standard indeed. As the majority in Davis succinctly stated:
We disagree with the respondent's asse1iion, however, that petitioner
seeks to hold the Board liable for G.F.'s actions instead of its own.
Here, petitioner attempts to hold the Board liable for its own decision
to remain idle on the face of known student-on-student harassment in
its schools.

b. Vicarious Liability of School Boards for the Acts of their Students
Another approach to remedying peer harassment treats the conduct
of the offending student as inherently discriminatory and then holds the
school board vicariously liable for that behaviour on policy grounds. It
should be noted that this form of vicarious liability differs from holding
the school board liable for its agent's acts (i.e. teachers and principals),
which is a recognized aspect of corporate and human rights law (see its
codification in section 40 of the Act).
A type of strict liability is imposed on the school board for the acts of
its students. Liability is strict in that it attaches automatically once the
act takes place. Traditional vicarious liability is a concept of tort law
used principally to hold employers accountable for the tortious acts of
their employees. Vicarious liability is not founded in agency theo1y, for
in most cases the employer would surely not approve of the tortious acts
of its employees. Instead it relies on principles of deterrence and the
provision of just remedies, as well as on the policy grounds that an
employer is in the best position to absorb the costs of vigilance over its
employees into the general expense of doing business. 55 In Robichaud,
the Supreme Court of Canada noted that tortious vicarious liability is an
inappropriate means for holding employers responsible for the discriminatory behaviour of their employees pursuant to human rights legislation. Rather, the court favoured a policy-based approach grounded in the
notion that in order for remedies to successfully eliminate discrimination, they must be directed against the employer. The Court noted that
"only an employer can remedy undesirable effects; only an employer can
provide the most important remedy- a healthy work environment."56
55
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It may therefore be possible, as in Robichaud, to found school board
liability on policy based vicarious liability. However, certain distinctions must be pointed out. Robichaud was concerned with an employment relationship and the interpretation of the phrase "in the course of
employment" as it pertained to discrimination in the Canadian Human
Rights Act. 57 Laforest J. stated that "it is unnecessary to attach any so1i
of label to this type of liability; it is purely statutory."58 As such,
applying vicarious liability to hold schools responsible for the acts of
their students would require a broad interpretation of Robichaud. No
similar statutory liability provision in the Nova Scotia Act imputes
liability onto the school board. Commentators have suggested that such
an approach is indeed possible. 59 In her article, Richard suggests that the
harassing student can be likened to a harassing co-employee, and thus
section 40 of the Act may be invoked to hold the school board vicariously, and therefore st1ictly, liable for the acts of the offending student. 60
However this requires imputing an employment or agency relationship
between the school board and the student. However, it may be too much
of a stretch in logic to find that a student is an employee or an "officer or
agent" acting "on behalf of' the school board, as is required in section 40
of the Act. 61
Indeed, even the majority in Davis specifically ruled out an agency
relationship between the student and the school district in the application of Title IX. This decision accepted the argument raised by the
school district that the wording of Title IX, which requires the discrimination to be "under any education program" 62 effectively meant that
discrimination must be carried out by an agent of the education providers. The school district argued that if an agency relationship were
required, then it would not be liable because there was no such relationship between it and its students. For this reason, the majority ruled that
for the discrimination to take place "under" the operations of the federal
recipient, it is sufficient that the harassment "take place in a context
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subject to the school district's control," and not necessarily be committed by one of its agents. 63
The dissent in Davis, however, believed that to find the school
district in violation of its federal funding agreement under Title IX, the
harasser must be an agent (i.e. teacher) of the school district. It noted:
The agency relation between the school and teacher is thus a necessary, but not sufficient, condition of school liability. Where the heightened requirements for attribution are met, the teacher's actions are
treated as the grant recipient's actions. In those circumstances, then,
the teacher sexual harassment is "under" the operations of the school.
I am aware of no basis in law or fact, however, for attributing the acts
of a student to a school and, indeed, the majority does not argue that
the school acts tlu-ough its students ... Discrimination by one student
against another therefore cannot be "under" the school's program or
activity as required by Title IX. 64

Deemed liability in s. 40 of the Act specifically requires an agency
relationship. It is submitted that the majority and the dissent in Davis
were both correct in deciding that students are not agents of school
boards. Thus, in the context of the Act and other human rights legislation, a provision which requires agency; such as section 40, cannot be
invoked to hold a school board liable. For instance, the successful
prosecution of an employer or employee organization under the Canadian Human Rights Act requires that "an officer or agent" must have
committed the discrimination. 65 However, if human rights legislation
does not require agency, then the majority decision in Davis suggests
that a court may be invited to broadly interpret the student's harassment
as falling under the school's control.
A different approach to the application of the principle of strict
liability is that taken by the Supreme Court of Canada in Ross v. New
Brunswick School District No. 15. 66 In that case, the off-duty conduct of
a teacher who publicly promoted anti-Semitic beliefs, was found to have
63
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created a "poisoned" learning environment, not only for the Jewish
students in the school, but for all students. The poisoned environment67
may arise as a result of harassment. This enviromnent is one in which the
conduct and/or persistence of the harasser demeans, humiliates or upsets
its target, such that the environment becomes psychologically and/or
emotionally intolerable to the victim. A "modified objective" test is
used to detennine whether an enviromnent is poisoned. The adjudicator
must determine whether a reasonable person, in the position of the
victim, would perceive the circumstances as giving rise to a psychologically or emotionally negative environment. 68 The Court in Ross found
that the school board itself discriminated against the students through its
failure to proactively address the controversy, 69 since any acquiescence
or initial failure to address such harassment is seen as acceptance or
condonation of such behaviour by the school board.
One of the contributing factors to the creation of the poisoned
environment in Ross was the fact that teachers are in "a position of
influence and trust over their students and must be seen to be impartial
and tolerant." 70 This relationship does not exist in the interactions
between students. Since a failure to act can create liability in school
boards, it is therefore conceivable to impose a positive obligation on
schools to adopt a policy to promote equality where it is reasonably
foreseeable that unequal treatment will exist in the school enviromnent.
In Ross, the Supreme Court agreed with the Board oflnquiry that school
authorities have an obligation "to work towards the creation of an
enviromnent in which students of all backgrounds will feel welcomed
and equal.. .. A school board has a duty to maintain a positive school
enviromnent for all persons served by it and it must be ever vigilant of
anything that might interfere with this duty."71
The primary obstacle in applying the reasoning in Ross to a situation
of peer harassment lies in persuading a human rights tribunal that the
actions of one student toward another are as capable of creating a
poisoned enviromnent as are the discriminating actions of a teacher.
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Ross makes it very clear that the position of the teacher as a role model is
in part responsible for his or her influence on the learning environment.
Even the majority in Davis recognized that the behaviour of students in
the primaiy and secondary school settings is not comparable to the
conduct expected of a teacher, or other adult, when it stated that:
Comis, moreover, must bear in mind that schools are unlike the adult
workplace and that children may regularly interact in a manner that
would be unacceptable among adults .. .Indeed, at least early on, students are still learning how to interact appropriately with their peers. It
is thus understandable that, in the school setting, students often engage
in insults, banter, teasing, shoving, pushing, and gender-specific conduct that is upsetting to the students subjected to it. Damages are not
available for simple acts of teasing and name-calling among school
children, however, even where these comments target differences in
gender. Rather, in the context of student-on-student harassment, damages are available only where the behaviour is so severe, pervasive,
and objectively offensive that it denies it victims the equal access to
education that Title IX is designed to protect. 72

If the interpretation of the majority in Davis were applied, a higher

threshold for the finding of a hostile or poisoned environment in a
school would exist, as compared to that required in Ross. Not surprisingly, the dissent in Davis disagrees with the categorization of student
harassment as "discrimination." They note that the actions of young
school children are simply not sophisticated enough to be classified as
discrimination, and that the law recognizes that children are not fully
accountable for their actions because they lack the capacity to exercise
mature judgn1ent. 73 Consequently, analogies to the hostile environment
created by sexual harassment in the workplace are inappropriate to the
school setting. The dissent states:
No one contests that much of this "dizzying array of immature or
uncontrollable behaviors by students," ... is inappropriate, even "objectively offensive" at times ... and that parents and schools have a
moral and ethical responsibility to help students learn to interact with
their peers in an appropriate manner. It is doubtless the case, moreover, that much of this inapprop1iate behavior is directed toward
members of the opposite sex, as children in the throes of adolescence
struggle to express their emerging sexual identities.
72
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It is a far different question, however, whether it is either proper or
useful to label this immature, childish behavior gender discrimination.
[S]chools are not workplaces and students are not adults. The norms of
the adult workplace that have defined hostile environment sexual
harassment ... are not easily translated into peer relationships in
schools, where teenage romantic relationships are a part of eve1yday
life. Analogies to Title IX teacher sexual harassment of students are
similarly flawed. A teacher's sexual ove1tures toward a student are
always inappropriate; a teenager's romantic ove11ures to a classmate
(even when persistent and unwelcome) are an inescapable part of
adolescence. 74

It is interesting that both the majority and the dissent seem to agree
that there ought to be a separate standard applied to students than that
applied to adults in detennining the existence of either direct discrimination or hostile environment discrimination. While it is easy to see the
logic behind assigning a different standard for children than for adults,
the reasoning behind such difference is disturbing. The dissent excused
typically inappropriate conduct among students on the basis that children going through puberty are expected to act in a sexually excited
manner that may lead to conduct that would be inexcusable among
adults. Such a perspective is easy to accept in Davis because the victim
and offender were both under ten years of age. However, students in
high schools may be as old as eighteen or nineteen, and as adults in the
eyes of the law their conduct is much more difficult to excuse.
One must wonder whether such a forgiving view would be taken if
Title IX allowed for an action against discrimination based on racial
harassment. Simple childish immaturity would likely be insufficient to
dismiss harassment based on racial grounds and the "boys will be boys"
excuse promoted in Davis would not apply. In the context of the Act, it
may be possible, or even appropriate, to apply a different standard to the
conduct of students than that which was applied to Ross in determining
whether certain actions created a poisoned environn1ent. However, fairness dictates that it would nevertheless have to be a standard that can be
uniformly applied in cases of sexual, racial, and all other fom1s of
harassment.
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In sum, there are several obstacles to overcome in attempting to hold
a school board vicariously liable for the harassing acts of its students.
First, there is no mechanism in the Act that allows this to happen
directly. Section 40 imputes a requirement of agency which cannot be
established between a school board and its students. A strict reading of
section 40 reveals that its drafting was influenced by the Robichaud
decision so as to encompass a myriad of organizations whose actions
should be deemed to be those of their agents when they discriminate.
The reasoning in Robichaud cannot be stretched to find liability in the
student-school board paradigm. Richard posits that the student-school
board relationship should be broadly and purposefully interpreted in
order to create an employment or agency type of relationship, however;
this approach is clearly beyond the vicarious liability relationships
contemplated by section 40.
The more successful approach would be to argue, as in Ross, that the
school board committed direct discrimination by creating a "poisoned
learning environment" through their inaction in the face of knowledge,
or imputed knowledge, of harassment. In Ross, Malcolm Ross' discriminatory actions, despite having taken place outside the school, came
under considerable scrutiny because of his position as a teacher and the
fiduciary duties associated with that role. However, fiduciary relationships do not exist between students, and as the court in Davis has
indicated, it would be inappropriate to treat primary or secondary school
student interactions as similar to the adult or employment relationships
that can produce hostile enviromnent discrimination. While the United
States Supreme Court was too quick to excuse the actions of many
offending students as simply being par for the adolescent course, their
underlying statement that students should not be treated as adults has
some merit and may be a barrier to establishing a poisoned environment.
The differential impact of harassment on students may force jurists
to develop an alternative test for determining whether a poisoned environment exists. If the "modified objective" test is applied without regard
for the diminished capacity of the offending students, and it is based
solely on the perceptions of a reasonable person in the position of the
victim, then this form of "poisoned environment" direct discrimination
may in fact be even more effective in holding the school board liable
than the fonn of direct discrimination earlier described. However, if the
current test is modified to account for the obvious concessions made for
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students who have a diminished capacity to appreciate the consequences
of their actions by virtue of their age, then the result may be diminished
success in imputing direct liability onto the school board. If such a
decision is necessary, it is submitted that a court should preserve the
"modified objective" test as it is, and not change the focus of human
rights protection from the victim to the harasser. Ultimately, the "poisoned environment" results from the approval and condonation by
school authorities, and so an "adult" standard must eventually be applied.
c. The Modified Middle Ground
The final test that may be applied to find a school board liable for the
actions of its harassing students adopts the direct liability approach of
Davis ("deliberate indifference") or Ross ("poisoned enviromnent") and
also allows a defence of due diligence to the school board. This is a
modified direct liability model.
The rationale behind allowing a due diligence defence was described
in Davis, where the majority recognized the impossibility of removing
absolutely all harassment from large student bodies. While ideally the
purpose of human rights legislation is the elimination of discrimination,
and thus may be seen as an effects-based approach, some regard has to
be given to the practical difficulties in completely eradicating such
problems. An organization that uses its best efforts, or efforts that are not
merely de minimus, ought not to be unfairly prosecuted for a violation of
human rights. This then expands the direct liability test to consider the
paiiies' intentions.
In fact, the majority in Davis may already have incorporated a due
diligence defence into its test for discrimination by imposing a "not
clearly unreasonable" standard on the actions taken by school authorities in response to harassment claims by its students.
The use of due diligence as a defence is not unusual in Canadian
human rights analyses. In Robichaud, Laforest J. held that:
an employer who responds quickly and effectively to a complaint by
instituting a scheme to remedy and prevent recmTence will not be
liable to the same extent, if at all, as an employer who fails to adopt
such steps. These matters, however, go to remedial consequences, not
liability. 75
75
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Furthermore, the Canadian Human Rights Act provides a defence of
due diligence to employers that applies to the determination of liability,
which would serve to preempt the action entirely. Section 65(2) reads:
65. (2) An act or omission shall not, by virtue of subsection (1), be
deemed to be an act or omission committed by a person, association or
organization if it is established that the person, association or
organization did not consent to the commission of the act or omission and
exercised all due diligence to prevent the act or omission from being
committed and, subsequently, to mitigate or avoid the effect thereof. 76

The Nova Scotia Act does not provide a statutory due diligence
defence. However, if a human rights action based on peer harassment
were allowed to proceed in Nova Scotia, then it is likely that the due
diligence defence in Robichaud would at least apply to remedies and
thus mitigate the consequences once liability has been established. Such
a defence would in fact be more relevant to the school scenario than in
the employment context, because a school board has less control over its
students than it does over its employees.
The school board could raise existing effective and preventive antidiscrimination policies as a strong defence. Furthermore, they should
treat complaints of harassment on prohibited grounds with the seriousness and expedience that they deserve. Ultimately however, as was the
case in Davis, the poor judgment, or plain indifference, on the pmi of
individual teachers will prove difficult for a school board to control,
even with the most proactive policies in place. Nevertheless, the strong
educative and consciousness-raising value of anti-discrimination policies coupled with the existence of a due diligence defence provides an
incentive for school boards to implement policies and procedures that
seek to prevent harassment before it begins and address it properly when
it does arise. Such a defence should not be regarded as an easy way of
escaping liability, but rather as a means of promoting a more effective
anti-discrimination policy in schools. As such, any action that allows a
school to be held liable for the acts of its harassing students under human
rights legislation should also afford a due diligence defence for both
liability and remedies.
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III. PEER HARASSMENT AND CIVIL LIABILITY
In the absence of a human rights complaint, victims of harassment
may rely on tort law. The tort of negligence is the most germane to the
type of harassment that a student is likely to experience, as exemplified
by the experiences of Azim Jubran and Lashonda Davis. The victim
may have a good claim against both the harasser (for instance for the
nominate torts of assault, battery and intentional infliction of mental
suffering, to name a few) and the school board for failure to provide a
safe learning environment.
There are two possible approaches to finding a school liable in to1t
for the actions of its students. One is to find the harassing student liable
in tort, and then to find the school vicariously liable for the harassing
student's actions, essentially imposing strict liability on the school
board for the actions of its students. 77 However, as discussed above,
vicarious liability is generally confined to the employer-employee relationship. Fmther, the control exercised by school authorities over students is very different from that exercised by employers over employees, particularly with respect to powers of dismissal. As such, this
approach will not likely attach liability to the school board.
Direct negligence is a preferable avenue, both on a theoretical and
practical level, for a victim of peer harassment to seek redress from the
school board. A party is liable for negligence when he or she fails to take
reasonable steps to prevent foreseeable harm occurring to a party to
whom she owes a duty. 78 Negligence better describes the duties owed to
students in the care of a school than does the circuitous and more policydriven approach found in vicarious liability. As such, a victim of harassment, such as Azim Jubran or LaShonda Davis, ought to be able to hold
his or her school accountable for their mistreatment at the hands of other
students resulting from the nonfeasance or misfeasance of school authorities.
A plaintiff must establish three elements to successfully claim negligence: a duty of care, a breach of the standard of care, and damage or
injury that results from that breach. 79
77
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1. Duty of Care:

It is generally accepted in law that educators owe a duty of care. This
duty is defined by common law, statutes, regulations and school policies. 80 Teachers and school authorities have a close relationship with
their students, as they are responsible for their care and control. In fact,
school authorities are considered to be acting in loco parentis. 81
Schools have a statutory obligation to provide a safe learning environment for the children under their care. This duty is enshrined in the
Nova Scotia Education Act in the enumerated responsibilities of teachers, principals and school boards. 82 Teachers have a further duty to
encourage and uphold relationships between students that are devoid of
harassment based on prohibited grounds. Relevant sections of the Education Act read as follows:
26. (1) It is the duty of a teacher in a public school to ...
(k) take all reasonable steps necessary to create and maintain an
orderly and safe learning environment;
(m) maintain an attitude of concern for the dignity and welfare of
each student and encourage in each student an attitude of concern for
the dignity and welfare of others and a respect for religion, morality,
truth, justice, love of country, humanity, equality, industry,
temperance and all other virtues. 83

This duty of care also manifests itself in the fonn of fiduciary
obligations, violation of which can found an independently recognized
cause of action. 84 Justice Laforest notes that there "is little doubt ... that
the teacher-student relationship is a fiduciary one," and this principle
was adopted by the Supreme Court of Canada in Ross. 85 Teachers are in
a position of confidence and trust with respect to their student, and have
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an obligation to act in the students' best interests86 both on and offduty.s1

2. Standard of care:
A school board's standard of care to avoid liability in negligence
was defined by the Supreme Court of Canada in Myers v. Peel County
(Board of Education), where Mcintyre J stated that:
The standard of care to be exercised by school authorities in providing
for the supervision and protection of students for whom they are
responsible is that of the careful or prudent parent ... It is not, however, a standard which can be applied in the same manner and to the
same extent in every case. Its application will vaiy from case to case
and will depend upon the number of students being supervised at any
given time, the nature of the exercise or activity in progress, the age
and degree of skill and training which the students may have received
in co1111ection with such activity, the nature and condition of the
equipment in use at the time, the competency and capacity of the
students involved, and a host of other matters which may be widely
varied but which, in a given case, may affect the application of the
prndent-parent standard to the conduct of the school authority in the
circumstances. 88 [Emphasis added]

The Supreme Court of Canada has also noted that the standard of
care will be modified depending on the nature of the activities in which
the students are engaged and the expertise required to instrnct the
students. 89 However, a modified standard would not apply to a typical
teacher in the normal course of his or her duty to uphold an enviromnent
free from student-on-student harassment.
The British Columbia Supreme Court had occasion to lend further
clarification to this test in the case of younger children and noted:
What is to be expected of a "reasonable parent"? Our Co mi of Appeal
has just said inLaPlantev. LaPlante, [1995] B.C.J. No. 1303 ... atp. 7:
"A parent, or other person responsible for small children, has, of
course, a duty to take reasonable care not to expose them to unreason86

Ibid. at 120.
Supra note 85 at 127.
88
(1981), 123 D.L.R. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.) at 10.
89
McKay v. Board of Govan School Unit No. 29 of Saskatchewan (1968), 68 D.L.R. (2d)
519 (S.C.C.).
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able risk of foreseeable hatm. The test to be applied in determining
whether that duty has been discharged is an 'objective' one in the
sense that the parent is expected to do, or not to do, that which,
according to community standards of the time, the ordinary reasonably
careful parent would do, or not do, in the same circumstances. But the
test is 'subjective' to the extent that the reasonable parent must be put
in the position in which the defendant found himself or herself, and
given only that knowledge which the defendant parent had ... [Counsel
for the defendant] says that 'error of judgment' alone will not amount
to negligence. That must, of course, be right, in the sense that there
may be several courses of conduct any of which a reasonably careful
parent might follow in a given situation, and it will be enough to
answer a claim in negligence that the course adopted by the defendant
parent was one of those which the reasonable careful parent might
have taken, even though events may, of course, have shown the choice
to have been unfortunate. " 90

The net effect of this reasoning is that there is considerable discretion afforded to parents, or those in loco parentis, that may amount to
something akin to a due diligence defence as outlined earlier in the
discussion of human rights jmisprudence.

3. Damages
There must be a proximate causal link between the negligence of the
school and legally recognized hann or damages that are suffered by the
student. Establishing damages may prove to be the most difficult part of
a student plaintiffs action. Where physical violence has resulted from a
failure of school authorities to intervene, there is a clearly recognized
legal injury. On the other hand, the loss of educational opportunities or
psychological harm is a less quantifiable and demonstrable injury. However, human rights legislation may offer better protection than the
common law against being deprived of an acceptable educational experience.
Several cases have indicated that it may be difficult to prove damages in the absence of both a recognized tort and head of damage. In
Gould v. Regina (East) School Division No. 77, the court upheld the
Supreme Court of Canada's earlier decision9 1 that there is no tort of
Yasinowski (Guardian ad !item) v. Gaud1y, [1995] B.C.J. No. 1513 (DRS 95-15695), iJ 58.
Her Majesty The Queen in Right of Canada v. Saskatchewan Wheat Pool, [ 1983] I
S.C.R. 205.
90
91
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breach of statute. Thus, a teacher cannot be held negligent for failing to
fulfill his or her duties under a relevant Education Act in the absence of
a tort on which to ground the action. In Gould, the statement of claim
was struck down for failure to show a cause of action. It was noted that
the stress, anxiety, and disruption in the plaintiffs life would be better
framed as a claim of intentional infliction of mental suffering or nervous
shock if actual harm had occuned. 92
In light of this, it is apparent that mere verbal harassment from a
student may not represent sufficient harm to the victim to impose
tortious liability on a harasser, let alone support a claim of negligence
against the school.
In the absence or failure of a human rights action for peer harassment, an action in negligence is the best recourse a victim may have. The
main difference between these two actions lies in the higher threshold of
damages required in negligence than in a human rights claim. T01i law
will require an actionable harm, whereas human rights law will seek to
promote equality and end discriminatory activity, whether or not the
activity is a recognized toli.

IV. THE PROPRIETY OF CREATING A HUMAN RIC.HTS
ACTION FOR PEER HARASSMENT

The pending Jubran case raises the question of whether the creation
of a human rights action benefits the complainant more than an alternative approach. As Feldthusen observes, there are several drawbacks to
pursuing a claim through human rights legislation. 93 He notes that under
current provincial and federal human rights schemes, complainants tend
not to have access to a hearing as of right. Complaints are typically
screened, and decisions about proceeding on a registered complaint are
based on factors that may not be relevant to the merits of the complaint.
Fulihermore, if the complaint proceeds to a Board of Inquiry, then the
complainant has little control over the case. Moreover, he notes that
Gaudry, supra note 90 at 156.
B. Feldthusen, "Relationship-Based Liability" in W.S. Wright & R.B. McNicol, eds.,
The 1996 Jsaac Pitblado Lectures: The Expanding Frontiers of Liability and Responsibility
(Manitoba: 1996) 116.
92
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damage awards in human rights proceedings are "notoriously low," due,
in part, to statutory limits. 94 Since the possibility of damages acts as an
incentive to the school board to act quickly and effectively to stem any
behaviour that may constitute harassment, it may be counter-productive
to pursue claims outside of tort. Furthennore, the damage awards available may not sufficiently reflect the hann done to the young victim of
peer harassment who requires therapy or other treatment. However, it
may be difficult to establish the existence of damages in tort based
merely on the vexatious and harassing behaviour of another student.
Nevertheless, one of the main benefits of human rights legislation is its
accessibility, particularly to those with limited resources.
A further problem with establishing an action grounded in human
rights legislation is that it may not protect all victims of student-onstudent harassment. This is a reflection of the arbitrary nature of harassment and bullying in schools. A student may be a victim of harassment
for belonging to a different socio-economic group, for being short,
overweight, unattractive, or for merely not quite fitting in. MacKay
suggests that the Canada Human Rights Act, and several other provincial human rights acts, ought to include "social condition" as a prohibited ground of discrimination. While a sin1ilar ground currently exists in
the Nova Scotia Act in the form of "source of income,"95 it is more
relevant to protection from a denial of accommodations than to protection from a hostile educational environment. "Social condition" may
eventually be a prohibited ground of discrimination under the Act, which
may broaden the protections that could be afforded by human rights
legislation.
The common law in Canada holds that there cannot be a civil tort
action for a recognized human rights claim. In Seneca College of Applied Arts and Technology v. Bhadauria, 96 the Supreme Court of
Canada held that the Ontario Human Rights Code precluded not only
"any civil action based directly upon a breach [of the Code] but it also
excludes any c01mnon law action based on an invocation of the public
policy expressed in the Code." In Bhadauria, the recognition of a new
intentional t01i of discrimination was rejected.
94

Ibid. at 126-7.
Supra note 2, section 5(1 )(t).
96 [ 1981] 2 S.C.R. 181, 124 D.L.R. (3d) 193 at 195 [hereinafter Bhadauria ].
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However, Bhadauria did not address whether the recognition of a
human rights challenge would also foreclose a civil action in negligence
brought by a victim of discrimination. If a statutmy human rights action
is recognized for peer harassment, the paradoxical situation could arise
where a victim of harassment based on prohibited grounds would be
required to file a complaint under the Act, whereas a victim of nondiscriminatory harassment would only have a cause of action in negligence, both for a fundamentally identical complaint. The decision in
Bhadauria may need to be revisited, since the recognition of a broad tort
of discrimination predicated not only on historical disadvantage, but
also on mental distress and loss of self-esteem and dignity, may offer
remedies to a wide range of victims, while overcoming the barriers
associated with a human rights complaint.
However, none of the current models of human rights legislation in
Canada, even with the potential inclusion of social condition, would
have protected Eric Harris and Dylan K.lebold from the barrage of
bullying that they received at the hands of their schoolmates. 97 Both of
these male students were heterosexual and members of white, upper
class society. While the harassment they experienced rivaled that of
Azmi Jubran and LaShonda Davis, they would not have been protected
under human rights legislation in the United States or Canada.
A significant failing of human rights legislation in the context of
peer harassment is that it fails to protect victims from the prolonged acts
of arbitrary malicious torment and disrespect that are common among
students. The result is a logically inconsistent system of protection,
under either tort or human rights law based on the type of harassment,
victim's characteristics and choice of epithets used by the offending
student.
The question of whether to expand anti-discrimination legislation to
include the outcast student speaks to the ve1y purpose of human rights
law. If it is designed to protect the vulnerable, then it would seem
97
On April 20, 1999, Eric HatTis and Dylan Klebold shot and killed a teacher and 12
students at Columbine High School in Littleton, Colorado. Shortly thereafter, they both
committed suicide. It was later revealed that the motivation for their actions lay, in part, on the
fact that they were labeled as outcasts and "geeks" by their peers, and were consequently the
subjects of constant tonnent and bullying. See online: Rocky Mountain News, "Columbine:
Hope from Heartbreak" <http://www.rockymountainnews.com/drmn/columbine/> (date accessed: 26 August 2001).
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intuitive that it should operate to protect all victims of peer harassment.
However, it is also understandable that human rights law should stay
within its mandate of protecting those who suffer from historical disadvantage based on immutable and irrelevant characteristics, and not stray
too far to protect others out of sympathy. In fact, for this very reason,
Justice LaF orest, in discussing proposed changes to the Canadian Human Rights Act, discourages extending the protections of human rights
law to include "personal harassment, that is, harassment unrelated to the
grounds of discrimination covered by the Act."98
The inclusion of peer harassment in human rights protection
schemes would also lead to the dilemma, highlighted by the dissent in
Davis, that many school children do not have the capacity to appreciate
the discriminatory effect of their teasing and taunting on an enumerated
ground. Over-zealous protection of victims may place a heavy burden
on school boards that may ultimately result in a chilling effect on
students' activities in school playgrounds. There is already considerable
criticism of the zeal with which zero tolerance rules governing student
interactions have been applied in schools. 99 One certainly does not wish
to stifle the social and intellectual growth of children by excessively
monitoring and scrutinizing their behaviour.
In response to this concern, the dissent in Davis is of the opinion that
it would be better to exclude the most offensive student harassment
rather than be excessively pedantic in attempting to label certain conduct as discrimination.
The majority seems oblivious to the fact that almost every child, at
some point, has trouble in school because he or she is being teased by
his or her peers. The girl who wants to skip recess because she is teased
by boys is no different from the overweight child who skips gym class
because the other children tease her about her size in the locker room;
or the child who risks flunking out because he refuses to wear glasses
to avoid the taunts of "four eyes"; or the child who refuses to go to

98 G.V. La Forest, chair, Promoting Equality: A New Vision. (Ottawa: Canadian Human
Rights Review Panel, 2000) at 146.
99 Known colloquially as the "kiss that shook the nation'', a six-year old first grader in
Lexington, North Carolina was suspended for one day after he kissed a female schoolmate on
the cheek. Allegedly the kiss was consensual. See E.K. Quesada, "Innocent Kiss or Potential
Legal Nightmare: Peer Sexual Harassment and the Standard for School Liability Under Title
IX" (1998) 83 Cornell L. Rev. 1014.
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school because the bully calls him a "scaredy-cat" at recess. Most
children respond to teasing in ways that detract from their ability to
learn. The majority's test for actionable harassment will, as a result,
sweep in almost all innocuous conduct it acknowledges is part of
school life. 100

Contrary to what the dissent states, much of this conduct is not
"innocuous," for it perpetuates the stereotypes and historical disadvantage that human rights legislation is intended to eliminate. While any
vicious harassment of peers should not be tolerated in schools, human
rights legislation dictates that there is something more offensive about
harassment based on sex, race, sexual orientation, or any other enumerated ground than harassment of a different nature. As such, it is not
paradoxical to have a dual system reflecting discrimination on different
grounds.

V. CONCLUSION
The purpose of human rights legislation is to condemn and prevent
discriminatory behaviour. In the case of student-on-student harassment,
this can be accomplished best by focusing more on the school authorities
than on the students themselves. For such liability to be effective, it must
be direct and not through constructing artificial vicarious liability. It is
not the acts of the students that are inherently discriminatory; rather, the
discrimination lies in the failure of the school authorities to stop, conect,
or curb harassing behaviour. Each student must be afforded protection
from harassment based on an enumerated ground. Otherwise, the message sent to both the harassers and victims is that it is acceptable for
people to be ridiculed or demeaned on the basis of one of these grounds.
In order to influence behaviour and thought, it is appropriate to subject
school authorities' actions or inaction to anti-discrimination legislation.
By sending a message to children that excessive teasing or harassment
on these grounds is inappropriate, and by holding school authorities
accountable to human rights regimes, the goal of condemning attitudes
of discrimination in all people, especially the young and impressionable,
will have been successfully satisfied.
100
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Exclusion from the protections of human rights legislation will no
doubt be of little consolation to the overweight child, or the bespectacled
child, or the social outcast. However, notwithstanding her suffering, the
cause of here torment simply does not fit into an anti-discrimination
regime. Fortunately, there are alternatives in tort and breach of fiduciary
duty. This bifurcated system may seem incongruous to someone who
regards any student-on-student harassment as reprehensible and worthy
of legal protection; however, the underlying rationale is sound.
One can argue that if a human rights action were to be recognized in
Canada with the same standard for direct liability as in Davis, then all
that would be accomplished would be to move a negligence action into
the administrative realm of a human rights tribunal. Given the antidiscrimination goals of the Act, it would seem intuitive that establishing
a human rights complaint should not be as onerous as a claim of
negligence. To be effective, human rights legislation should offer more
than merely an expedient, statutory claim in negligence. Demonstrating
that a denial of access to educational services has occurred should not be
on par with a tort of battery or intentional infliction of mental suffering,
as appears to have been done in Davis. Instead, it should recognize the
fragility of young victims and the ease with which a learning environment can become poisoned to the extent of exclusion. Ultimately, if the
door to human rights legislation is to be opened for student-on-student
harassment, then it should be opened wide enough to make it wo1ih
entering.

